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Abstract  
Emotional intelligence (EI) can buffer potentially harmful effects of 
situational and chronic stressors to safeguard psychological wellbeing (e.g., 
Mikolajczak, Petrides, Coumans, & Luminet, 2009), yet understanding how and 
when EI operates to promote adaptation remains a research priority. We explored 
whether EI (both trait and ability) modulated early attentional processing of threat-
related emotion under conditions of stress. Using a dot probe paradigm, eye 
movement (fixation to emotive facial stimuli, relative to neutral) and manual 
reaction time data were collected from 161 adults aged 18–57 years (mean age = 
25.24; SD = 8.81) exposed to either a stressful (failure task) or non-stressful 
(control) situation. Whilst emotion management ability and trait wellbeing 
corresponded to avoidance of negative emotion (angry and sad respectively), high 
trait sociability and emotionality related to a bias for negative emotions.  With most 
effects not restricted to stressful conditions, it is unclear whether EI underscores 
‘adaptive’ processing, which carries implications for school-based social and 
emotional learning programmes.  
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Emotional intelligence (EI) captures individual differences in perceiving, 
regulating and understanding emotions in others and oneself (Zeidner, Matthews, & 
Roberts, 2009).   EI can be considered a lower-order emotion-related trait (TEI), 
allied to broadband personality dimensions and measured via self-report (Petrides, 
Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007), or an IQ-type ability (AEI) indexed via maximal 
performance (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008).   Both TEI/AEI have been linked to 
adaptive outcomes, particularly psychological adjustment (Martins, Ramalho, & 
Morin, 2010).  However, in order to better understand the ‘adaptive’ nature of the 
construct it remains to be established how and when EI contributes to wellbeing.   
Commentators have suggested that those with high EI may be better able 
buffer the effects of stress to safeguard mental health (Zeidner et al., 2009). For TEI, 
experimental studies of psychological and physiological reactivity to stressors have 
supported this notion; higher levels relate to minimal mood deterioration, heart rate 
variation and cortisol release (Laborde, Brüll, Weber, & Anders, 2011; Mikolajczak, 
Roy, Luminet, Fillée, & de Timary, 2007).  The situation is less clear for AEI. Whilst 
Schneider, Lyons and Khazon (2013) found emotionally skilled individuals better 
able to maintain their mood, demonstrating ‘challenge’ vs. ‘threat’ physiology 
(increased cardiac activity) throughout a stressful lab session, higher AEI has also 
been related to an increase in post-task distress (Matthews et al., 2006) and slower 
recovery post social-stressor (cortisol secretion) (Bechtoldt & Schneider, 2016).  
Thus, whilst differences in stress reactivity as a function of EI are manifest, it is clear 
that the nature of effects differs according to type of EI. 
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EI and attention 
Differences in stress reactivity could be attributed to early attentional biases 
for emotional information, moderated by EI.  Very little research has examined how 
facets of EI may operate at an ‘automatic’ or procedural level; instead focusing on EI 
as controlled, deliberate processing (e.g., in the domain of mental health, how 
emotional understanding relates to effortful coping styles).  But it is clearly the case 
that emotionally intelligent behaviors (i.e., emotion perception, recognition, 
regulation) may also be represented at an ‘automatic’ level, such that individuals are 
not consciously aware of the operation of these processes.  Attentional processes are 
pivotal to both early regulatory (orienting; rapid detection of threat) and later effortful 
coping (strategy selection) processes (Gross & Thompson, 2007).  Hence by directly 
influencing ‘upstream’ selection of emotive environmental cues, EI may serve to 
modify ‘downstream’ stressor reactivity processes such as coping, which may 
ultimately explain why EI relates to mental health. Thus, by examining the role of EI 
in automatic attentional processes, research can begin to explain additional variance 
in emotionally intelligent behaviour hitherto ignored (Fiori & Vesely-Maillefer, in 
press).  
According to theory, biased allocation of attentional resources to emotional 
content should be a key hallmark of high EI and result in advantageous processing 
performance e.g., detection and recognition of briefly presented and/or subtle 
emotional cues (Fiori, 2009).  Empirically, AEI has been associated with rapid 
discrimination of negative emotional faces vs. neutral (Farrelly & Austin, 2007) and 
with faster decoding of mismatched non-verbal and verbal cues (Jacob et al., 2012), 
although not selective attention in an affective priming task (Fiori & Antonakis, 
2012). TEI relates to faster identification of morphed facial expressions (Petrides & 
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Furnham, 2003) but not efficiency of visual search for emotional faces or 
identification of micro-expressions (Matthews et al., 2015).  Comparison of findings 
is complicated by variations in task paradigms and attentional processes tapped (e.g., 
filtering; search etc), and, crucially, it remains unclear whether EI underscores 
‘adaptive’ attentional processing in context i.e., where patterns of processing are 
expected to vary with environmental demands/stressors leading to ‘typical’ vs. 
‘atypical’ trends (see e.g., Pessoa, 2009).  This is necessary to understand the 
protective function of EI and why there are differences in stressor reactivity as a 
function of TEI/AEI.  
 
Attentional selection under stress 
Attentional selection of emotion under stressful conditions has been almost 
exclusively studied in clinical and sub-clinical (i.e., high-level trait vulnerability) 
populations, commonly employing orienting paradigms (e.g., dot probe task) (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007).  Key 
cognitive-level individual difference theories make competing predictions about 
‘adaptive’ attentional selection under conditions of stress. Williams, Watts, MacLeod 
& Mathews (1988, 1997) argue that those with low trait anxiety should show a 
tendency to divert attention away from danger-related information to minimise 
increases in negative affect.  The opposite is predicted for anxiety-prone individuals. 
These tendencies should become further pronounced with increasing stress. 
Corroborating studies have found threat-vigilance under conditions of chronic stress 
in individuals with underlying vulnerability, yet threat-avoidance in those with low 
trait anxiety (MacLeod & Matthews, 1988; Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994).  
However, Mogg, Mathews, Bird and Macgregor-Morris (1990) found that underlying 
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vulnerability made no difference to preference for threat under situational stress; both 
high and low trait anxious groups showed a vigilance bias. 
Mogg and Bradley (1998) suggest that these patterns of selection can be 
qualified by the level of threat (state or stimuli).  Under lower levels of stress (i.e., 
mildly stressful environments or aversive stimuli), those with low levels of 
vulnerability should orient away from threat-related emotion, whilst those with higher 
vulnerability should orient towards threat. However, with increasing levels of stress, 
both high and low trait vulnerable individuals should similarly orient towards danger-
relevant material.  This ‘graded’ attentional selection allows for greater flexibility in 
adaptive responding, screening out less relevant, low-level emotional information and 
protecting the appraisal system from switching to the ‘hyper-vigilant’ state associated 
with clinical disorders.  As the theoretical model that has received most empirical 
support to date (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006; Mogg, 
McNamara, et al., 2000; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003; Yiend & Mathews, 2001), it has 
been suggested that adaptive avoidance of danger at lower threat levels, yet vigilance 
at more severe levels of threat, would represent a ‘healthy’ selection pattern and could 
characterize a protective cognitive marker that might be targeted for bias modification 
work (Yiend, 2009).  
 
EI and attentional selection under stress: The current study 
With control for known indicators of vulnerability (i.e., trait neuroticism; 
anxiety and depression), high scorers on measures of EI (a latent level resource) 
should represent a ‘low-vulnerable’ population, permitting researchers to ascertain the 
relative contribution of EI as a protective resource in early attentional selection.  To 
date, only one study has examined this. Using a dot probe task, Mikolajczak, Roy, 
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Verstrynge and Luminet (2009) found adults with high trait EI (self-control) showed a 
bias for emotionally valenced words under stressful vs. non-stressful conditions, 
whilst the reverse was true for those with lower levels of trait EI, suggesting that low 
trait EI underpins an atypical pattern of attentional selection. Conclusions are 
however speculative, as a result of methodological shortcomings (e.g., measured 
response to arbitrary symbols vs. biologically salient faces using a composite 
‘emotion’ index vs. negative or positive words). Additionally, dot probe reaction time 
data can only provide an indication of attentional deployment at the time of probe 
presentation (i.e., post-stimuli presentation) and with target stimuli typically presented 
for 500ms, multiple attentional shifts may take place prior to the onset of the probe 
(Yiend, 2009).  One way to address this limitation is to measure eye movements 
(initial orientation) with the onset of target stimuli.  Eye tracker devices offer a fast, 
reliable and more direct measure of attention through continuous sampling of data, 
than indirect motor behaviour (i.e., reaction time key press) (Armstrong & Olatunji, 
2009).    
The current study seeks to extend extant literature by utilizing a facial dot 
probe paradigm and multiple measures of attentional bias (eye movement and reaction 
time data) to explore whether EI (trait; ability) moderates early attentional processing 
for threat-related emotion under situational stress.  To recap, the current consensus 
suggests ‘typical’ or low vulnerable individuals should orient away from threatening 
(angry) at low levels of stress (i.e., control conditions), yet orient towards threat at 
higher levels of stress (i.e., induced situational stress).  As EI is touted as an adaptive 
latent level trait, this study will explore whether those with high EI follow this 
‘protective’ pattern of orienting to danger contingent on threat level. It is 
hypothesized that there will be differences in reaction times and direction of initial 
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fixations to threatening faces, relative to neutral, between those with high and low 
levels of A/TEI as a function of group (‘control’ or ‘stress’ manipulation condition). 
To generate sufficiently ‘stressful’ conditions, stimuli depicting emotional 
expressions of strong intensity will be used in tandem with induced transient stress 
(failure experience).  Responses to positive (happy) and other negative (sad) emotion 
will be examined for comparison.  Finally, given known associations between 
attentional biases and mood disorders (i.e., depression and anxiety) (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007), and the overlap between EI (particularly TEI) and broadband personality traits 
(Petrides et al., 2007), the latter will be controlled to facilitate as ‘clean’ an 
assessment as possible of the role of EI in attentional selection. 
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Methodology 
 
Participants 
161 adults (121 females; 40 males) aged 18–57 years (Mean age = 25.24; SD 
= 8.81) were recruited via opportunity sampling from a University campus located in 
the West Midlands, UK, and provided informed consent to participate.  The upper age 
limit of the sample was within the boundaries of age related attentional biases for 
emotion that are associated with older adults (within the sixth decade of age, adults 
typically attend to positive affective stimuli and avoid negative) (see e.g., Mather & 
Carstensen, 2003). Only adults with normal levels of visual acuity were eligible to 
participate.  Participants were randomly assigned to a control (n = 83) or experimental 
condition (n = 78).   This study received ethical approval from the University 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Procedures 
Participants completed psychometric measures (i.e., TEI, AEI, internalizing 
disorders, personality) online up to three weeks prior to completing the lab-based 
experimental session. At the lab, participants provided a baseline index of negative 
affective state (PANAS) and were randomly assigned to the experimental (stressful) 
or control (neutral) condition.   Consistent with previous literature (Krohne, Pieper, 
Knoll, & Breimer, 2002; Mikolajczak, Roy, et al., 2009) and recommendations for 
standardised methods of affect induction (Nummenmaa & Niemi, 2004), a failure task 
paradigm (‘bogus IQ’ test) was used to manipulate mood in the experimental group.   
Participants were informed that they were to be tested on a measure designed to 
predict career success and were expected to have an 83% success rate (i.e., from 12 
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items, 10 or more completed correctly within a time limit of 6 minutes). Test stimuli 
were drawn from the most challenging items within Raven’s Advanced Matrices 
(Raven, 1976) and impossible to complete successfully within the allotted time.   
Participants completed the items alone in a test cubicle.  After 6 minutes, answer 
sheets were collected and the PANAS administered again to index any change in 
negative affect post-manipulation.  Those allocated to the control condition read an 
emotionally neutral magazine article (confirmed through piloting) and rated the 
content for readability.  No time constraints were imposed.   Participants were then 
invited to complete the dot probe task whilst eye movements were recorded. On 
completion of the task, participants were debriefed and thanked for their contribution.  
 
Measures 
Ability EI was indexed using the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding 
(STEU) and the Situational Test of Emotion Management (STEM) (MacCann & 
Roberts, 2008).  The 42-item STEU requires participants to choose the most plausible 
emotion arising from a particular scenario from a choice of five, e.g., “Something 
unpleasant is happening. Neither the person involved, nor anyone else can make it 
stop. The person involved is most likely to feel? (a) Guilty  (b) Distressed  (c) Sad  
(d) Scared  (e) Angry”.  Items describe context-free (above), personal or workplace 
scenarios, testing knowledge relating to 14 different emotions.  In line with 
Roseman’s (2001) appraisal-based emotion theory, items are scored as 
correct/incorrect (e.g., option [b] above) generating a total score.  The STEM requires 
participants to choose the most effective course of action for managing emotion 
(anger, sadness, fear) across 44 personal or workplace scenarios (e.g., “Lee’s 
workmate fails to deliver an important piece of information on time, causing Lee to 
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fall behind schedule also. What action would be the most effective for Lee?”). Four 
options are presented for each item and scored using expert weights, yielding a total 
score. STEM, STEU and MSCIET scores are significantly associated (Austin, 2010) 
and demonstrate acceptable levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability 
(Libbrecht & Lievens, 2012; MacCann & Roberts, 2008).   
 Trait EI indexed via the Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire-Short 
Form (TEIQue-SF: Petrides, 2009) consists of 30 statements (e.g., “Many times, I 
can’t figure out which emotion I’m feeling”) tapping four factors: Sociability 
(competencies necessary for developing strong personal relationships), Emotionality 
(e.g., perceived skills in negotiation, networking), Self-control (capability in 
controlling internal urges and external pressure/stress) and Wellbeing (degree of 
satisfaction with life).  Participants respond using a seven-point scale: strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The TEIQue-SF has robust psychometric properties 
(including item discrimination) with full-scale alpha typically in the range of α = .87; 
factors: α = .64 (Cooper & Petrides, 2010; Petrides et al., 2010).   
 Internalising disorders were assessed using the Hospital Anxiety And 
Depression Scale (HADS: Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Participants rate how often each 
of the 14 statements (e.g., “I feel tense or wound up”; “I can see the funny side of 
things”) has been true for them recently using a 4-point scale: never (0) through to 
most of the time (3). The HADS has been comprehensively validated in clinical and 
typically-functioning populations (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 2002). 
Personality was measured using the Big Five Inventory (BFI-44; John, 
Donahue, & Kentle, 1991). 44 statements tap thoughts, feelings and behaviours 
central to the ‘Big Five’ traits of Neuroticism (N); Extraversion (E); Openness (O); 
Agreeableness (A) and Conscientiousness (C) (see John & Srivastava, 1999 for 
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review).  Participants indicate the extent of their agreement with each statement (e.g., 
“I see myself as someone who is outgoing, sociable” [E]) by means of a five-point 
scale: strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).  Dimensional scores are derived 
from summed item averages (1-5). Srivastava, John, Gosling and Potter (2003) 
reported adequate levels of internal consistency and factorial validity in data drawn 
from 132,515 adults aged 21-60 years old.  
Negative affect (NA) was indicated via the 10-item subscale of the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants rate 
the extent to which they are experiencing ten negative emotional states at the time of 
completion (e.g., distressed, irritable, nervous) using a 5-point scale: very slightly/not 
at all (1) to extremely (5). The PANAS has excellent psychometric properties 
(Crawford & Henry, 2004) with the NA subscale demonstrating construct validity 
with measures of general distress and state anxiety (Watson et al., 1988).  
Attentional bias was assessed using a visual dot probe paradigm presented 
using Eprime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, USA), configured in line with 
previous research (Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). 
104 pairs of faces were constructed using stimuli from the NimStim repository 
(http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm) - a repository of 43 ethnically diverse actors 
modeling 8 different facial emotions of high intensity that have good levels of inter-
rater reliability and validity (Tottenham et al., 2009).  32 face pairs depicting angry-
neutral expressions, 32 happy-neutral, 32 sad-neutral, and 16 neutral–neutral pairs 
(for use as filler/practice trials) were constructed.  Each pairing used expressions from 
the same actor, with equal numbers of males and females drawn from a range of 
ethnicities.  Images measured 90mm x 110mm and spaced 215mm apart, set against a 
white background.  Stimuli were presented twice across two blocks, yielding 224 
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experimental trials. Trials began with presentation of a central fixation cross (500ms), 
followed by a face pair (500ms).  With offset of the pair, a probe stimulus (triangle) 
immediately appeared in the location previously occupied by one of the faces (neutral 
or emotional face) for 1100ms or until key press response.  Thus, the stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA) between cue and target was 500ms across all trials; a duration 
traditionally used in studies of threat-related bias, thought to capture attentional 
mechanisms occurring prior to the onset of ‘controlled’ processing (around 1000ms)  
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Yiend, 2009).  The probe replaced the emotional (congruent) 
or neutral face (incongruent) with equal frequency across trials, and positioning of 
emotional vs. neutral faces (left or right side) was randomized.  Participants were 
instructed to focus on the central fixation cross and then press one of two response 
keys as quickly as possible to indicate the location of the probe (‘a’ for left or ‘l’ for 
right). Standardised instructions and 6 practice trials were presented at the beginning 
to aid familiarization. Manual reaction times were recorded for the interval between 
onset of the probe and key press response.   Faster reaction times to probes replacing 
emotionally valenced (e.g., happy, sad, angry) vs. neutral faces reflect an attentional 
bias for that particular emotion type. Eye movements (direction of gaze post-offset of 
the central fixation cross) were recorded for each trial using an ASL MobileEye XG 
eye tracking system (Applied Science Laboratories, Bedford, MA), at a temporal 
resolution of 30Hz and an accuracy of .5-1.0 degree visual angle. Regions of interest 
(either left or right facial stimuli) were applied to the data post collection using ASL 
Results+ software. Eye movements occurring before 100ms after presentation of the 
fixation cross were filtered from the data set, as these ‘anticipatory’ eye movements 
are not considered dependent on emotional stimuli (Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 
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2004). Prior to each experimental block, the eye tracking equipment was calibrated 
using a 9-point visual display. The task took 10 minutes to complete.  
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Results 
Data preparation and analytical strategy 
Manual reaction time (RT) data were prepared in line with established 
attentional bias research (e.g., Mogg et al., 2007; Mogg et al., 2004).  The complete 
data set of 32,200 experimental trials was initially screened for incorrect responses 
(direction of the probe) and outliers (RTs +/- 2 SD from the mean RT: 386.77 ms). 
For each measure of EI, participants were dichotomized into high or low groups using 
mean scores1.  Groups (level of EI or condition) did not differ in error rate (3.27%) or 
                                                        
1 This approach was considered appropriate for the current analyses given 
theoretical (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999) and empirical precedence (Davis & 
Humphrey, 2012; Keefer, Parker, & Wood, 2012; Mikolajczak, Roy, Verstrynge, & 
Luminet, 2009; Petrides & Furnham, 2003) for the existence of meaningful group-
based differences in the construct.  These studies have used a variety of statistical 
approaches (treating EI as both continuous and dichotomous variable), to detect group 
differences, which suggests that the construct has the characteristics to allow 
equivalent performance of methods (DeCoster, Iselin, & Gallucci, 2009). An 
isomorphic analytical strategy best fits the study methodology (quasi-experimental 
design) and conceptualisation, where clarity and parsimony are sought to report group 
differences in line with clinical literature, which has documented differences in 
attentional bias between clinical and sub-clinical groups (e.g., Mogg, Garner, & 
Bradley, 2007; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004). Importantly, recent analysis 
illustrates that whilst dichotomization may result in a loss of power, it can 
nevertheless yield statistically reliable findings when variables do not exhibit 
multicollinearity (see table 1), such that there is no increased chance of making a 
Type I error (Iacobucci, Posavac, Kardes, Schneider, & Popovich, 2015a, 2015b). 
Thus, the trade-off in statistical power was deemed acceptable in order to satisfy 
conceptual and methodological requirements.    
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in outliers (7.96%).  Table 2 displays mean RTs for each condition across types of EI.  
Attentional bias scores for each emotion type (angry, sad, happy) were computed as 
an index of vigilance for/avoidance of emotional faces using a standard methodology 
(Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998).   The mean RT to congruent stimuli 
(probe and emotional face appear in same position) was subtracted from the mean RT 
to incongruent stimuli (probe and emotional face appear in different positions) for 
each participant per emotion type.  Positive values indicate an attentional bias for the 
emotional relative to neutral face, whilst negative values suggest a bias away from the 
emotional face (0 = no bias).  Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that angry, sad 
and happy bias scores did not significantly differ from a normal distribution (all p > 
.20). 
Eye movement (EM) data preparation.  Due to technical issues, only a subset 
of participants from the original sample (N=89) were eye-tracked.  There were no 
significant associations between missing cases and demographic variables (i.e., sex, 
age).  Two participants had more than 70% incomplete trial data (i.e., made very few 
EMs to faces) and their data were excluded from analyses to avoid distorting the 
calculation of bias scores (see below).  This resulted in a final sample N ranging 
between 87-89 for EM analyses (see table 3 for n per group).   Missing cases did not 
significantly differ in relation to TEI, AEI, mood disorders or personality (all t < 
(159) 1.96, p > .05).  Trials were initially screened to filter responses that occurred 
before 100ms after the onset of a face pairing, as these ‘anticipatory’ EMs are thought 
to occur independently of the emotional stimuli (Mogg et al., 2004).   Groups (level 
EI or experimental condition) did not differ in frequency of anticipatory EMs. Table 3 
displays mean number of EMs for each condition across the three types of EI.  
Directional bias scores were computed for each participant for angry, sad and happy 
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faces following Mogg, Miller & Bradley (2000).  Analysis of bias scores is 
preferential to using count data, given the interdependency of EM measures (i.e., 
within stimuli pairs, EMs towards an emotional face cannot be considered 
independent of the number of EMs away from that particular face type). This index 
was derived by dividing the number of trials where the first fixation was directed 
towards the emotional face, by the total number of trials with fixations to emotion-
neutral pairings of that emotion type (e.g., first fixations to happy faces divided by the 
total number of happy-neutral fixations). Scores > .5 indicate a preference to look 
towards the emotional instead of the neutral face, whilst values < .5 suggest a bias to 
look away from the emotional face and towards the neutral  (.5 = no bias).  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicated that angry, sad and happy directional bias scores 
did not significantly differ from a normal distribution (all p > .06). 
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations between study variables were 
computed first, followed by a 2 (time: pre-manipulation vs. post) x 2 (group: 
experimental vs. control) repeated measures ANOVA for negative affect scores, to 
verify that the stress manipulation had been successful.  To address the hypothesis 
that there would be differences in reaction times and direction of initial fixation to 
threatening faces (relative to neutral, happy and sad faces) between those with high 
and low levels of A/TEI  as a function of group (‘control’ or ‘stress’ manipulation 
condition), a series of 2 (group: experimental vs. control) x 2 (EI: high vs. low) 
ANCOVAs controlling for depression, anxiety and personality, were run to test for 
significant differences in attentional bias, followed by directional bias, for each 
emotion type (angry; sad; happy).   This method of analysis was selected over an 
omnibus test to ensure sensitivity for discrete hypothesis testing within each group 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), with all analyses adjusted for multiple comparisons. 
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Descriptive statistics and manipulation check 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for the 
questionnaire variables.  TEI scores shared robust associations with mood disorders 
and four of the Big 5 personality dimensions (significant r range = .23-.76) yet were 
unrelated to AEI measures, consistent with previous literature (e.g., Austin, 2010; 
Brackett & Mayer, 2003). AEI emotion management and understanding were 
moderately related (r = .38, p < .001) but not significantly associated with personality, 
as expected (MacCann & Roberts, 2008).  There was a negligible, inverse association 
between emotion understanding and depression.  Aside from negligible, positive 
correlations with AEI emotion understanding and trait openness, there were no age-
related effects in the data set.  Consequently, the influence of the Big Five, depression 
and anxiety were controlled in subsequent analyses.  There were no significant 
correlations between RT bias scores and EM directional bias scores (e.g., angry 
directional bias and angry RT bias: r = -.02, p = .86) confirming that EM and RT data 
provide discrete measures of early attentional orienting bias (Mogg et al., 2000).  
 
A 2 (time: pre-manipulation vs. post) x 2 (group: experimental vs. control) 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed on negative affect scores to verify that the 
stress manipulation had been successful.   There was a significant effect of time (F (1, 
159) = 43.70, p < .001, partial η2 = .22), group (F (1, 159) = 41.93, p < .001, partial η2 
= .21) and a time x group interaction (F (1, 159) = 106.82, p < .001, partial η2 = .40), 
such that those in the experimental condition had significantly higher levels of 
negative affect post-manipulation (M = 17.14, SD = 5.55) compared to those in the 
control condition (M = 11.22, SD = 1.84) and pre-manipulation scores (M = 12.37, SD 
= 2.83) as anticipated. 
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 In light of literature suggesting that EI may moderate psychological reactivity 
(e.g., Matthews et al., 2006; Mikolajczak et al., 2007), a 2 (time: pre-manipulation vs. 
post)  x 2 (group: experimental vs. control)  x 2 (EI: high vs. low) repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed to check for the potential moderating effect of EI on mood 
change.  There were no significant interaction effects involving either AEI 
(understanding or management), TEI (or its facets), e.g., AEI management: F (1, 157) 
= .03, p = .87).  Thus, the experience of negative affect between time 1 and time 2, 
across experimental groups, did not vary as a function of level of EI.  
 
Predicting attentional bias for emotional faces under stress: RT data 
A series of 2 (group: experimental vs. control) x 2 (EI: high vs. low) 
ANCOVAs controlling for depression, anxiety and personality, were run to test for 
significant differences in attentional bias for each emotion type. There were no 
significant effects across groups in attentional bias for happy faces.  For angry faces, 
there was a significant main effect of AEI management, such that those lower in AEI 
emotion management showed a bias towards threat-related emotion relative to neutral 
emotional expressions, whilst those higher in AEI management oriented away from 
threat towards neutral emotion (F (1, 154) = 4.03, p < .05, partial η2 = .03).  However, 
the AEI x condition interaction effect was non significant (F (1, 154) = 1.16, p > .05) 
indicating this preference was not contingent upon condition (stressful or control).  
For sad faces, those higher in TEI Emotionality showed a bias towards sad faces 
relative to neutral expressions, with the reverse true for those with lower TEI 
Emotionality (F (1, 153) = 5.56, p < .05, partial η2 = .04).  This was not contingent on 
condition (TEI emotionality x condition: F (1, 153) = .32, p > .05) and thus appeared 
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to be a general orienting bias to sad faces per se.  Analyses at the level of total TEI 
were all ns.  AEI emotional understanding was not related to attentional bias for any 
type of emotional face.   
Predicting attentional bias for emotional faces under stress: EM data 
Directional bias scores for first fixations to each emotion type were entered 
into a series of 2 (group: experimental vs. control) x 2 (EI: high vs. low) ANCOVAs 
controlling for depression, anxiety and personality. There were no significant effects 
across groups in directional bias for happy faces.  For angry faces, there was a 
significant main effect of TEI Sociability, such that those higher in TEI Sociability 
showed a preference for looking first at angry rather than neutral faces, with the 
reverse true for those with lower TEI Sociability (F (1, 78) = 5.40, p < .05, partial η2 
= .07).  However, the TEI x condition interaction was non-significant (F (1, 78) = .43, 
p > .05), indicating this preference was not context-dependent (stressful or control).  
There was a marginally significant main effect of AEI management, such that those 
lower in emotion management skills looked first at threat-related relative to neutral 
emotional expressions, whilst the reverse was true for those with higher skills (F (1, 
78) = 3.42, p = .07, partial η2 = .04).  Again, a non-significant AEI x condition 
interaction effect (F (1, 78) = 1.13, p > .05) suggested this was a general orienting 
preference per se.  For sad faces, there were no significant main effects of TEI 
Wellbeing (F (1, 76) = .036, p > .05) or condition (F (1, 76) = .04, p > .05) on eye 
direction bias.  However, the TEI Wellbeing x condition interaction effect was 
significant (F (1, 76) = 6.94, p < .05, partial η2 = .08). Under stress, those higher in 
TEI Wellbeing looked away from sad faces compared to neutral, whilst individuals 
with lower TEI wellbeing looked towards sad faces under stress.  This pattern was 
EI & ATTENTIONAL BIAS FOR EMOTION UNDER STRESS 
 
 
21 
reversed under non-stressful conditions (see Figure 1). Analyses at the level of total 
TEI were ns.  AEI emotional understanding was not related to directional preference 
for any type of emotional face. 
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Discussion 
This study is the first to examine whether EI moderates attentional processing 
of threat-related emotion under situational stress using multiple measures of 
attentional bias (eye movement; reaction time data).  A complex pattern of 
preliminary findings emerged. EI was found to relate to attentional selection, beyond 
the effects of broadband personality dimensions, suggesting this is an important 
individual difference to consider in mental health trajectories. Specifically, 
differences in the early detection of salient, negatively valenced stimuli were found (a 
‘vigilance’ or ‘facilitation’ bias). This contrasts with previous studies reporting non-
significant findings for more deliberate processing at extended stimulus exposures 
using alternative paradigms (e.g., Matthews et al 2015; Fiori 2012). However, effects 
varied according to type of EI (trait/ability) and type of facial emotion (sad/angry), 
with patterns generally not contingent on stress context, leaving open the question as 
to whether EI is truly ‘adaptive’.   
 
Ability EI and attentional bias under stress 
Manual data (500ms presentation time) demonstrated that participants who 
were highly skilled in emotion management looked away from threatening faces 
(orienting to neutral), compared to lower-skilled individuals who were drawn to 
threat. This trend was corroborated via a marginally significant effect of first fixation 
eye movements to angry versus neutral faces  (>100ms).  Effects were restricted to 
skills in emotion management (not understanding) and to selection of angry faces (not 
sad or happy), yet represented a general orienting preference, operating across both 
benign and stressful conditions. Findings appear consistent with the notion that low 
AEI represents a latent vulnerability for mental health problems (Martins et al., 2010), 
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akin to subclinical anxiety, whereby pronounced bias for threat is evident under both 
stressful and neutral conditions, intensifying unmanageable levels of negative affect 
and precipitating disordered symptomatology (MacLeod & Matthews, 1988; Williams 
et al., 1988, 1997).    However, it is inconsistent with recent consensus in the literature 
which suggests that a ‘protective’, interactive pattern of orienting to danger, 
contingent on threat level, should be observed (i.e., avoidance at low, not high levels 
of stress) (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Yiend, 2009). Clearly, it is 
not always advantageous to ignore biologically salient cues that may signal 
impending threat.   As such, it is difficult to establish the adaptive worth of this 
pattern of attentional selection.   
Given this study successfully stimulated ‘acute’ transient stress through 
manipulation of negative affect and used high intensity facial emotions, two possible 
explanations are apparent; either emotionally intelligent individuals did not perceive 
the level of stress engendered (state or stimuli) to be acutely threatening, or, their 
patterns of attentional selection were characterised by additional features not captured 
by the current measures.  To ascertain which of these explanations is plausible it will 
be necessary for future research to manipulate procedural variables. Differences in 
threat perception thresholds can be examined by varying the stress context (i.e., 
chronically stressful conditions as well as acute) and by utilising stimuli of ‘graded’ 
intensities. Studies point to discrepancies in the observation of vigilance bias as a 
function of prolonged (chronic) or transient (acute) stress (e.g., Mogg et al., 1994) and 
threat values of stimuli, e.g., a human scream (Massar, Mol, Kenemans, & Baas, 
2011), distressing visual scenes (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 
2004). EI may relate to sensitivity in detecting and discriminating emotive cues (e.g., 
Jacob et al., 2012; Knyazev, Mitrofanova, & Bocharov, 2013) – not all of which show 
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‘benefits’ for high EI scorers (Baker, ten Brinke, & Porter, 2013). Within the facial 
dot probe paradigm, future studies could also, therefore, vary stimuli intensity to 
establish whether selection biases are due to threat perception differences.    
Recent literature also argues against the notion that attentional selection is a 
unitary, stimulus-driven process and that a combination of processes (vigilance, 
disengagement, avoidance) work in tandem to guide early selection (Cisler & Koster, 
2010). The current data indicate that those low in AEI were initially drawn to threat 
(>100ms) but then may have experienced difficulty disengaging from the target 
location to shift towards neutral stimuli (still engaged with threat at 500ms).  It is also 
possible that those high in AEI were initially drawn to neutral stimuli (>100ms), and 
then rapidly engaged with threat before seeking out safety signals and re-directing 
back to neutral stimuli, thus avoiding threat (at 500ms). In order to clarify whether 
disengagement (maladaptive) and avoidance (adaptive) distinguish between low and 
high-skilled individuals, varied presentation times for stimuli alongside dwell time 
data for first fixation eye movements are required.  These two attentional features are 
considered to reflect more controlled, strategic processing, best captured at later 
stimulus onset asynchronies in comparison with the more automatic, rapidly occurring 
stimulus-driven vigilance biases (Cisler & Koster, 2010).   For instance, 
disengagement difficulties have been observed between 100ms and 500ms (Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Koster et al., 2004, 2006; Massar et al., 2011; 
Sagliano, Trojano, Amoriello, Migliozzi, & D'Olimpio, 2014), whilst avoidance can 
manifest from 200ms onwards (e.g., Bradley et al., 1998; Koster et al., 2006; Onnis, 
Dadds, & Bryant, 2011), with specificity according to level of trait and state anxiety.  
It is possible therefore, that EI modulates these later elaborative processes as well as 
early vigilance, particularly given skill in emotion management taps high-order, 
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‘strategic’ rather than ‘experiential’ elements of EI (i.e., use and perception of 
emotion). It will be important to now replicate these findings with extended testing of 
the full AEI domain. 
 
Trait EI and attentional bias under stress 
 Effects for TEI diverged significantly from the AEI pattern, once again 
emphasizing the distinctiveness of the two (Petrides, 2011). There were no significant 
effects of TEI on attentional bias at the global level. This is not unexpected given 
heterogeneous, global TEI shares much overlap with broadband personality traits 
(controlled for in the current analysis) (Petrides et al., 2007), with analysis of 
remaining facet-level variance permitting a nuanced insight into the TEI-attentional 
processing relationship (Matthews et al., 2015). Only components encompassing 
experiential emotional experience (emotionality: emotion 
perception/expression/empathy; sociability: management of others/social awareness; 
wellbeing: self-esteem/optimism) related to attentional biases. Two general orienting 
patterns (operating irrespective of context) were found. Individuals with higher 
emotionality showed vigilance for sad faces (manual data), whilst those with higher 
sociability looked first at angry faces (eye movement data), suggesting higher self-
rated competency relates to a generalised preference for negative (vs. neutral) affect-
related stimuli. As per discussion of AEI effects, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
this reflects ‘adaptive’ processing.  Additionally, an interactive effect was found for 
wellbeing; under stress, those with higher levels looked away from sad faces, 
compared to their lower scoring counterparts, for whom a sad vigilance bias was 
observed.  This pattern was reversed under non-stressful conditions.   
 In line with theory and evidence, high TEI (low vulnerability) should only 
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relate to a preference for threat-related emotion under conditions of moderate to high 
stress (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Yiend, 2009).  The 
‘hypervigilance’ for negative emotional content detected in the current data would 
more closely correspond with the pattern expected for clinical groups.  It is unclear 
why vigilance biases were detected in benign conditions for those with high self-
perceived emotional understanding and awareness. In each case, the lack of 
synchrony between measurement methods (i.e., first fixation and later key press) 
suggests the data may not have captured multiple attentional shifts occurring over the 
time course.  For example, those high in trait sociability may be initially vigilant then 
avoidant after 100ms, whilst a difficulty disengaging may explain the high trait 
emotionality effect, as reported elsewhere in low vulnerable individuals (e.g., 
Sagliano et al., 2014).  Variable stimulus presentation times (100ms to 1250ms), in 
concert with dwell time data, would illuminate these issues, and also allow 
researchers to ascertain whether the more ‘strategic’ trait self-control (perceived 
ability to manage self-relevant emotion) relates to effortful attentional control at later 
stages of processing.  Indeed, using EEG, Fisher and colleagues (2010) detected a link 
between high trait emotional clarity (strategic understanding) and reduced extended 
processing of negative stimuli (348-768 ms), in contrast to an early attentional bias 
for negative stimuli (88-148 ms) for those with high levels of emotional awareness 
(experiential TEI). Consequently, it may also be the case that TEI ‘profiles’  (i.e., 
different levels of strategic and experiential facets combined within the same 
individual) relate to more or less adaptive attentional processing; Papousek, 
Freudenthaler, & Schulter (2011) noted that following exposure to emotionally salient 
video clips, differences in frontal EEG asymmetry varied as a function of level of 
experiential (perceived ability to identify emotion in others) and strategic TEI 
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(perceived ability to regulate own emotion), e.g., those high in experiential but low in 
strategic TEI exhibited delayed responsiveness.   Future research may consider 
examining such intra-individual differences using an attentional paradigm.   
 Clearly, aspects of TEI which capture general wellbeing (self-esteem, 
optimism, happiness) operate differentially to those predominantly concerned with 
socio-emotional processing, contrasting markedly with theoretical predictions.  
Higher levels related to a bias away from sad faces (versus neutral) in stressful but not 
benign conditions, with the reverse true for those with lower levels.  Positive self-
system beliefs, notably self-esteem, are traditionally associated with better 
psychological and interpersonal adjustment (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2016) and there is 
evidence to suggest that high levels buffer individuals from the physiological and 
subjective effects of stress (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992).  Differences in attentional 
biases may underlie this effect; individuals with high self worth can inhibit attention 
to interpersonally relevant ‘rejection’ cues, whilst those with low self-esteem are 
drawn to this material (e.g., Li, Zeigler-Hill, Luo, Yang, & Zhang, 2012). Thus, those 
with high self-esteem are able to defend their positive self-perceptions and guard 
against potential threats to wellbeing and social value. Avoidance of negative 
emotional content under acutely stressful conditions may, therefore, allow high trait 
wellbeing individuals to prevent self-esteem decline and fortify a positive world-view.    
 It is also worth noting that TEI appears to relate to early attentional processing 
of negative affect per se (i.e., sad and angry faces) in contrast to the threat-specific 
effects found for AEI.  As no baseline differences were found in subjective mood 
state, this could be a result of the type of stress manipulation employed. It is possible 
that the ‘Bogus IQ’ task also engendered feelings of sadness captured by the measure 
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of general negative affect used here.   This would indicate that TEI is a more domain-
general facilitator of mood-congruent processing (borne out by non-significant effects 
for happy emotion), consistent with literature examining broadband personality 
markers.  For instance, Neuroticism has underlies an array of clinical disorders and 
relates to a generalized difficulty disengaging from valence-free information 
(Bredemeier, Berenbaum, Most, & Simons, 2011; Malouff, Thorsteinsson, & Schutte, 
2005).  Future studies might consider using a more stress-sensitive indicator of 
subjective state (e.g., Speilberger Sate-Trait Inventory; Spielberger, 1989) and/or an 
experimental manipulation which may more closely replicate real-life social and 
emotional stress (e.g., Trier Social Stress Test; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 
1993) to gain a more nuanced understanding of this effect. 
Limitations and conclusions 
 
 This study offers preliminary data to suggest that high levels of ability and 
trait EI relate differentially to attentional selection.  It is as yet unclear whether this 
corresponds with ‘adaptive’ processing under stressful circumstances.  Using the 
current findings as a foundation, researchers must now extend investigation to 
examine the full time-course of attentional selection with eye movement data.  
Examination of EI and attentional processing should be investigated using alternative 
attentional paradigms (attentional blink; visual search) to address issues of reliability 
and validity leveled at the dot probe task (Schmukle, 2005).  Whilst this study sought 
to maximize the explanatory power of the findings by incorporating measures of both 
trait and ability EI, future studies will need to index experiential AEI and a more 
comprehensive measure of TEI (the short form version of the TEIQue yielded a 
relatively low estimate of internal consistency for TEI Sociability).   It may also be 
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the case that those reporting high levels of TEI possess (or choose to report) 
inaccurate perceptions of their abilities – indeed measurement of TEI can be prone to 
faking (Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, & Coaster, 2012).  Whilst this is informative 
in itself (Petrides, 2011), it would aid interpretation to have an indication of the 
relative accuracy of self-report to ascertain how best to characterize attentional 
patterns (e.g., emotionally skilled vs. hubristic or image conscious individuals). 
Finally, whilst no significant sex differences were detected across measures of 
attentional bias in the current data, the imbalance of males and females should also be 
addressed going forward to allow further differentiation of effects in line with recent 
research in the field (Sass et al., 2010).  
 Given the drive to train or improve EI in young people and adults (Schutte, 
Malouff, & Thorsteinsson, 2013), findings from the current study underscore the need 
to better understand how and when EI operates to support key adaptation processes.  
Whilst EI relates to distinct patterns of attentional bias for emotion, findings hint that 
not all facets (TEI) and skills (AEI) are equally implicated in this process, and there 
may be more or less optimal levels for each.  This suggests that universal ‘off the peg’ 
interventions may not always be suitable  - individually tailored training targeting 
specific EI competencies, based on existing levels of skill, could be more appropriate. 
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Table 1: Correlations and descriptive statistics for questionnaire measures (N = 161) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. TEI Total  -               
2. TEI Wellbeing .83** -              
3. TEI Self control .70** .51** -             
4. TEI Emotionality .74** .49** .26** -            
5. TEI Sociability .67** .40** .37** .39** -           
6. AEI Management  .05 .08 .02 .12 -.10 -          
7. AEI Understanding  .10 .08 .15 .08 .01 .38** -         
8. Depression -.59** -.57** -.50** -.37** -.33** -.12 -.20* -        
9. Anxiety -.56** -.48** -.66** -.23** -.32** -.03 -.15 .57** -       
10. Neuroticism -.57** -.51** -.76** -.12 -.31** .07 -.08 .42** .61** -      
11. Extraversion .60** .54** .27** .38** .54** .00 -.06 -.37** -.26** -.39** -     
12. Conscientiousness .48** .36** .37** .34** .23** .04 .10 -.25** -.26** -.31** .19* -    
13. Openness .08 .07 -.01 .09 .14 -.06 .06 .10 .04 .02 .10 -.02 -   
14. Agreeableness .37** .32** .25** .39** .05 .10 -.10 -.23** -.21** -.27** .17* .37** .02 -  
15. Age -.02 .02 .05 .01 -.15 .12 .19* .12 -.11 -.02 -.10 .02 .34* .07 - 
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* 
Alpha (α) .89 .84 .68 .72 .32 .80 .63 .75 .83 .83 .87 .77 .70 .75 - 
Mean (SD) 146.89 
(22.78) 
5.25 
(1.14) 
4.27 
(1.04) 
5.07 
(.99) 
4.82 
(.92) 
197.6
3 
(9.38) 
25.83 
(4.36) 
3.68 
(3.13) 
7.31 
(4.09) 
3.18 
(.81) 
3.34 
(.82) 
3.66 
(.63) 
3.58 
(.54) 
3.84 
(.61) 
25.24 
(8.81) 
 
Note: TEI = trait emotional intelligence; AEI = ability emotional intelligence 
* p < .05; **p < .001
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Table 2: Manual reaction times to face stimuli as a function of experimental condition and group (N= 161) 
Condition Group Congruent stimuli  Incongruent stimuli  
  Angry M (SD) Sad M (SD Happy M 
(SD) 
 Angry M (SD) Sad M (SD) Happy M (SD) 
 TEI Wellbeing        
Experimental Low (n =32) 384.45 
(53.33) 
389.98 
(55.36) 
389.02 
(52.72) 
 386.63 (54.28) 394.47 (55.17) 389.30 (53.97) 
 High (n = 46) 380.48 
(46.65) 
383.24 
(46.95) 
379.30 
(48.73) 
 380.37 (45.65) 384.87 (48.11) 382.71 (47.55) 
Control Low (n =33) 375.07 
(41.20) 
378.04 
(42.06) 
378.42 
(43.26) 
 382.91 (44.06) 381.43 (37.86) 381.53 (46.27) 
 High (n = 50) 374.15 
(48.40) 
370.18 
(45.02) 
373.03 
(41.86) 
 374.02 (46.74) 371.20 (43.81) 374.43 (43.89) 
 TEI Self Control        
Experimental Low (n = 39) 376.93 
(44.68) 
378.30 
(46.10) 
382.28 
(46.49) 
 380.69 (43.54) 386.21 (45.72) 380.69 (48.00) 
 High (n = 39) 387.27 393.71 384.30  385.18 (54.63) 391.41 (56.27) 390.15 (52.20) 
EI & ATTENTIONAL BIAS FOR EMOTION UNDER STRESS 
 
 
45 
(53.43) (53.71) (54.44) 
Control Low (n =32) 377.90 
(42.19) 
389.30 
(40.45) 
382.50 
(41.03) 
 386.12 (45.49) 385.91 (33.38) 384.31 (43.77) 
 High (n =51) 372.39 
(47.61) 
363.28 
(43.15) 
370.57 
(42.74) 
 372.18 (45.33) 368.59 (45.07) 372.83 (45.15) 
 TEI Emotionality        
Experimental Low (n = 36) 383.65 
(49.15) 
389.02 
(55.66) 
385.52 
(57.18) 
 387.39 (51.89) 388.99 (54.30) 388.93 (53.58) 
 High (n = 42) 380.78 
(49.80) 
383.43 
(45.80) 
381.38 
(44.18) 
 379.12 (46.92) 388.65 (48.65) 382.41 (47.25) 
Control Low (n =33) 387.55 
(41.92) 
392.69 
(40.74) 
388.77 
(43.84) 
 393.08 (45.82) 388.61 (38.10) 392.16 (44.77) 
 High (n = 50) 365.91 
(45.97) 
360.52 
(41.28) 
366.19 
(39.04) 
 367.30 (42.94 366.46 (41.84) 367.41 (42.28) 
 TEI Sociability        
Experimental Low (n = 42) 387.89 
(47.90) 
390.13 
(53.58) 
388.59 
(53.97) 
 388.23 (49.85) 394.40 (52.08) 390.11 (52.94) 
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 High (n = 36) 375.36 
(50.51) 
381.20 
(46.53) 
377.10 
(45.62) 
 376.76 (48.23) 388.59 (53.97) 379.94 (46.58) 
Control Low (n = 40) 388.34 
(47.45) 
390.48 
(39.97) 
387.35 
(39.74) 
 389.40 (45.05) 390.55 (38.64) 392.15 (45.71) 
 High (n = 43) 361.65 
(39.80) 
357.34 
(41.42) 
363.84 
(41.77) 
 366.53 (43.85) 361.05 (39.56) 363.39 (39.42) 
 AEI Management        
Experimental Low (n = 28) 393.73 
(60.34) 
407.15 
(62.38) 
400.88 
(65.07) 
 400.55 (63.13) 406.81 (62.22) 401.45 (60.76) 
 High (n = 50) 375.60 
(40.96) 
374.17 
(37.92) 
373.44 
(36.97) 
 373.03 (36.33) 378.73 (40.80) 376.43 (40.88) 
Control Low (n = 38) 376.70 
(41.10) 
376.40 
(41.01) 
378.41 
(38.54) 
 380.37 (44.61) 377.68 (35.94) 381.16 (42.71) 
 High (n = 45) 372.66 
(49.15) 
370.70 
(46.28) 
372.44 
(45.38) 
 375.17 (46.84) 373.23 (46.17) 373.95 (46.55) 
 AEI Understanding        
Experimental Low (n = 35) 383.10 390.34 387.31  385.65 (44.15) 391.92 (46.96) 390.61 (47.36) 
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(43.39) (47.98) (48.29) 
 High (n = 43) 381.29 
(53.97) 
382.09 
(52.39) 
380.02 
(52.21) 
 380.73 (53.25) 386.27 (54.48) 381.19 (52.30) 
Control Low (n = 42) 380.80 
(47.38) 
377.68 
(44.25) 
379.75 
(40.72) 
 381.53 (47.16) 379.58 (38.81) 382.91 (45.18) 
 High (n = 41) 368.08 
(42.93) 
368.84 
(43.38) 
370.48 
(43.74) 
 373.48 (44.22) 370.85 (44.34) 371.45 (44.02) 
 
Note: TEI = trait emotional intelligence; AEI = ability emotional intelligence; Experimental = stress condition; Control = neutral task condition; Congruent 
stimuli = probe and emotional face in same position; Incongruent stimuli = probe and emotional face in different positions. 
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Table 3: Mean number of initial eye movements (first fixations) to face stimuli as a function of experimental condition and group 
Condition Group Gaze direction: Towards   Gaze direction: Away  
  Angry Sad Happy  Angry Sad Happy 
 TEI Wellbeing        
Experimental Low (n =19-20) 8.85 (6.66) 10.37 (6.95) 8.11 (5.95)  10.35 (6.79) 9.00 (5.34) 9.89 (6.94) 
 High (n = 25-26) 8.42 (5.63) 8.54 (6.24) 9.32 (6.49)  7.77 (5.09) 8.73 (5.59) 9.00 (5.39) 
Control Low (n =21) 7.52 (4.58) 7.71 (5.17) 8.33 (5.48)  8.81 (4.59) 8.67 (4.90) 8.87 (5.71) 
 High (n = 21-22) 9.27 (6.60) 11.00 (7.09) 9.41 (6.16)  8.91 (6.38) 8.86 (5.52) 9.55 (7.33) 
 TEI Self Control        
Experimental Low (n = 23-24) 9.25 (6.56) 10.54 (7.00) 9.74 (6.46)  10.29 (6.46) 9.33 (5.70) 10.35 (6.83) 
 High (n = 21-22) 7.91 (5.47) 7.91 (5.81) 7.76 (5.92)  7.36 (5.07) 8.29 (5.23) 8.33 (5.00) 
Control Low (n =18) 7.56 (4.93) 8.78 (5.57) 7.83 (5.45)  8.22 (4.98) 7.89 (4.85) 8.17 (5.29) 
 High (n =24-25) 9.04 (6.23) 9.79 (6.96) 9.64 (6.03)  9.32 (5.92) 9.42 (5.38) 9.80 (7.31) 
 TEI Emotionality        
Experimental Low (n = 21) 9.25 (6.34) 9.05 (6.34) 8.52 (6.38)  9.05 (5.77) 9.38 (5.42) 9.48 (5.72) 
 High (n = 23-25) 7.84 (5.78) 9.54 (6.83) 9.04 (6.20)  8.76 (6.23) 8.38 (5.51) 9.30 (6.46) 
Control Low (n =20-21) 7.90 (5.96) 8.65 (6.09) 8.00 (5.55)  8.33 (5.37) 8.20 (5.01) 8.70 (5.95) 
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 High (n = 22-23) 8.91 (5.55) 10.00 (6.65) 8.96 (6.12)  9.36 (5.72) 9.27 (5.35) 9.48 (7.10) 
 TEI Sociability        
Experimental Low (n = 23-24) 9.00 (5.70) 9.71 (5.88) 9.57 (6.33)  10.33 (5.61) 7.02 (5.79) 10.13 (5.75) 
 High (n = 21-22) 8.18 (6.49) 8.86 (5.34) 7.95 (6.13)  7.32 (6.06) 8.62 (6.20) 8.57 (6.40) 
Control Low (n = 23) 9.23 (5.68) 9.61 (6.60) 8.91 (5.25)  9.78 (5.22) 8.61 (4.30) 9.78 (6.41) 
 High (n = 19-20) 7.50 (5.74) 9.05 (6.19) 8.85 (6.51)  7.80 (5.77) 8.95 (6.15) 8.35 (6.74) 
 AEI Management        
Experimental Low (n = 17-19) 9.53 (5.89) 10.56 (7.38) 10.35 (6.51)  9.84 (6.85) 10.89 (5.50) 11.47 (6.56) 
 High (n = 27) 7.96 (6.15) 8.48 (5.91) 7.81 (5.94)  8.22 (5.28) 7.48 (5.03) 8.07 (5.42) 
Control Low (n = 16-17) 8.53 (5.91) 9.38 (6.37) 8.94 (6.74)  8.23 (5.57) 9.50 (5.27) 9.35 (6.19) 
 High (n = 26) 8.35 (5.67) 9.35 (6.46) 8.85 (5.23)  9.27 (5.54) 8.31 (5.14) 8.96 (6.85) 
 AEI Understanding        
Experimental Low (n = 22-23) 8.78 (5.77) 9.96 (7.35) 9.55 (6.31)  9.65 (6.22) 9.61 (5.72) 10.36 (6.81) 
 High (n = 22-23) 8.43 (6.41) 8.63 (5.66) 8.05 (6.18)  8.13 (5.72) 8.05 (5.12) 8.41 (5.15) 
Control Low (n = 26-27) 9.35 (5.12) 9.58 (4.88)  9.59 (5.73)  10.04 (5.08) 9.85 (6.02) 10.00 (6.70) 
 High (n = 16-17) 7.00 (6.39) 7.44 (5.46) 7.69 (5.88)  7.06 (5.80) 8.56 (6.97) 7.62 (6.14) 
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Note: TEI = trait emotional intelligence; AEI = ability emotional intelligence; Experimental = stress condition; Control = neutral task condition. N.B. n per 
group reflects the range of sample n per face type (e.g., in the experimental condition, 20 participants were classified as low TEI Wellbeing in analysis of first 
fixations to angry faces; 19 in analyses of data for sad and happy faces). 
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Figure 1: Mean proportion of initial eye movements (EMs) toward sad faces on trials with 
sad-neutral face pairs, as a function of group and experimental condition 
 
 
 
Note: Mean proportional scores > .5 indicate a bias to look first at the sad face rather than the 
neutral, whilst scores < .5 suggest a bias to look away from the sad face towards the neutral 
stimuli (.5 = no bias). 
 
